Greg Detre
Monday, October 02, 2000
M&C = Matter and consciousness, Paul Churchland
ontological (aka mind-body) problem
ontology = what things really exist, and what their essential nature is
the essential nature of conscious intelligence resides in something non-physical, beyond the scope of sciences like physics, neurophys and compsci
its distinguishing claim is that each mind is a distinct non-physical entity whose identity is independent of any physical body to which it may be temporarily �attached�
mental states + activities derive their special character from their being states + activities of this unique, non-physical substance
but this is an almost entirely negative characterisation
discusses Descartes� account �
proposed �animal spirits� as the material substance by which the mind�s influence is conveyed to the body, but it simply transfers the problem to how these animal spirits can interact with something entirely non-spatial like mind
Descartes� basic principle of division is no longer as plausible anyway � it�s now neither useful nor accurate to characterise ordinary matter as that-which-has-extension-in-space
e.g. electrons are bits of matter, but our best current theories describe it as a point-particle with no extension or determinate spatial position at all
this is Churchland�s name for a less radical form of substance dualism that:
minds are inside the bodies they control, i.e. a spiritual substance quite unlike physical matter in its internal constitution but fully possessed of spatial properites even so, and located inside the machine of the human body
this way, the mind-body interaction can perhaps be understood in terms of an exchange of energy of a form that we don't yet recognise/understand in scientifically
it might even turn out that this sort of dualism can be fitted into familiar (very well-established) laws of conservation of energy and momentum, and e=mc2 etc.
this also leaves some hope that mind might somehow survive the death of body
while there is no substance to be dealt with beyond the physical brain, the brain has a special set of non-physical properties possessed by no other kind of physical object
these are the properties characteristic of conscious intelligence
they are non-physical in the sense that they cannot ever be reduced to or explained solely in terms of the concepts of the familiar physical sciences
they require a new + autonomous �science of mental phenomena�
aha � this is �perhaps the oldest version of property dualism�
mental phenomena are not a part of the physical phenomena in the brain that ultimately determine our actions and behaviour, but rather ride �above the fray� (Gk �epi� above)
e.g. they appear/emerge beyond a certain neural complexity
while mental phenomena are caused to occur by the various activities of the brain, they do not have any causal efects in turn
one�s actions are exhaustively determined by physical events in the brain, which also cause our epiphenomenal desires, volitions etc.
there is constant conjunction then, but not causality between volitions + actions
after all, human behaviour appears to be exhaustively a function of the activity of the physical brain
but we can't deny the reality of our experiences, beliefs/desires etc.
so the epiphenomenalist admits the realit of mental properties as non-physical but demoted to impotent epiphenomena that don't interfere with a scientific explanation of behaviour
mental properties do indeed have causal effects on the brain + behaviour
as in epiphenomenalism, mental properties are emergent (i.e. result from complexity, e.g. solidity, colour and life)
but the property dualist makes the further claim that mental states + properties are irreducible
i.e. not just organisational features of physical matter in the above examples, but novel properties beyond prediction/explanation by physical science
but evolutionary emergence + physical irreducibility appear at odds with each other�
the property dualist could relinquish evolutionary emergence and claim that mental properties are fundamental properties of reality, like length, mass, electric charge etc.
after all, even at the turn of the century, scientists thought that a reduction of electromagnetic phenomena to mechanical phenomena was in the bag (e.g. radio waves as oscillations of a ubiquitous jelly-like ether)
unfortunately however, unlike electromagnetic properties, which are displayed at all levels of reality, mental properties are displayed (noticeably??? how do we know this???) only in large physical systems that have evolved a very complex internal organisation
so why should we accept the irreducibility of mental properties (the most basic claim of dualism)?
argument from religion
Churchland responds:
by noting religion�s resistance to (correct) scientific ideas in the past
and that social forces are the primary determinants of religious belief for people in general
argument from introspection
= that mental states + properties, as revealed by introspection, could hardly be more different from physical properties
he responds that:
this argument assumes our faculty of inner observation reveals things as they really are in their innermost nature
despite the fact that our other sensory impressions are quite different from their real constitution (e.g. wavelengths, sinusoidal compressions in the air etc.), and similarly, our introspections don't seem like electrochemical states in a neural network
argument from irreducibility
it seems clear that there could be no purely physical explanation for some mental phenomena
e.g. language, reason, qualia, the meaningful content of our thoughts + beliefs (i.e. intentionality???)
he responds that:
a calculator can simulate (+ surpass) much of the mathematical reasoning that so impressed Descartes
�machines have proved capable of some of the capacities � that past dualistic philosophers have held up as forever closed to mere physical devices�, see ch 6, blah blah
explaining/predicting the intrinsic qualities of our sensations + the meaningful content of our beliefs + desires is a major challenge for the materialist
�it is in fact not impossible to imagine how such explanations might go, though the materialist cannot yet pretend to have solved either problem�
but dualists have failed to establish that physical reduction is outright impossible, as they need to do
parapsychological phenomena
assumes that parapsychological phenomena such as telepathy + telekinesis are real and beyond purely physical explanation
responds:
it�s just another instance of the argument from irreducibility
as before, it�s not clear that they�re irreducible
still empirically dubitable
arguably, materialism is simpler, since it only posits one class of entities
Ockham�s razor: �do not multiply entities beyond what is strictly necessary to explain the phenomena�
dualism�s explanatory impotence �(especially relative to neuroscience/materialism)
although the dualist can argue that the materialist�s successes so far in explaining behaviour in terms of brain structure will fall short of some central/core capacities explicable only in terms of dualism
but Churchland argues that we have come some way towards explaining even central capacities materialistically
argument from neural dependence of all mental phenomena
moreover, have shown that reason, emotion + consciousness are all subject to damage to + manipulation of the brain
this argument does not undermine property dualism, since (like materialism) it considers the brian to be the seat of all mental activity
argument from evolutionary history
if the human species and all of its features are the wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process, then we are notably only in that our nervous system is more complex + powerful (difference of degree not kind) than simpler creatures
three motivations:
1. reaction against dualism
2. the idea that the meaning of any sentence was ultimately a matter of the observable circumstances that would tend to verify/confirm that sentence (logical positivism)
3. general assumption that most/all philosophical problems are the result of linguistic/conceptual confusion, to be dissolved by careful analysis of the language in which the problem is expressed
= that talk of mental states is a shorthand way of talking
about actual + potential patterns of behaviour
strongest form: any sentence about a mental state can be paraphrased (without loss of meaning) into a long + complex sentence about what observable behaviour would result if the person in question were in this, that or the other observable circumstance
e.g. �x is water soluble� is equivalent by definition to �if x were put in unsaturated water, x would dissolve�
this is an operational definition, i.e. a definition in terms of certain operations/tests that would reveal whether or not the term actually applies in the case to be tested
unlike solubility though, most mental states are multi-tracked dispositions
the mind-body problem then is a pseudo-problem
behaviourism is clearly compatible with materialism, since material objects can also have material dispositions
it can also be made compatible with dualism, if you argue that our multi-tracked dispositions are grounded in immaterial mind-stuff rather than molecular structures
ignores/denies the �inner� aspect of our mental states (qualia)
the list of conditionals required to specify in detail a multi-tracked disposition said to constitute a given mental state appeared to be indefinitely/infinitely long
no term whose definiens is (indeterminably) open-ended + unspecific in this way can be well-defined
the conditionals by which we define a mental state seem to need to include further mental states, and so on
= the appraoch that any new theoretical terms invented by the science of psychology should be operationally defined in order to guarantee that psychology maintains a firm contact with empirical reality
in contrast, philosophical behaviourism makes the much stronger claim that all of the common-sense psychological terms in our prescientific vocabulary already get their meaning from operational definitions
= mental states are physical states of the brain
i.e. each type of mental state/process is numerically identical with some type of physical state/process (in the brain/CNS)
we don't yet know enough empirically to state the relevant identities, but they will eventually be revealed
cf previous intertheoretic reductions
intertheoretic reduction = where a new + very powerful theory entails a set of propositions + principles that mirror (have the same structure as/apply in the same cases as) those of an older theory/framework, and so we say that the new + old terms refer to the same things (though the new terms describe reality better)
often these involve cases whether the things/properties being reduced are observable things + properties within our common-sense conceptual framework
he argues that there would therefore be nothing particularly surprising about a reduction of our familiar introspectible mental states to physical states of brain
i.e. where neuroscience provides an isomorphism with our common-sense conceptual framework for mental states
four reasons for believing that we can reduce folk psychology to neuroscience
1. human physical origins + constitution
2. evolutionary theory as our best explanation of the behaviour-controlling capacity of the brain
3. neural dependence of all known mental phenomena
and identity theory posits only one rather than two classes of properties + operations, unlike property dualism
4. neuroscience�s success so far at unraveling the nervous systems, and so explaining the behaviour capacities, of many simpler creatures
Churchland considers these to provide an overwhelming case for the idea that the causes of human + animal behaviour are essentially physical in nature
but not necessarily for the further claim of the identity theory that:
neuroscience will discover a taxonomy of neural states standing in one-to-one correspondence with the mental states of our common-sense taxonomy as required for the claim of intertheoretical identity
argument from introspection
but, like all our external senses, it seems plausible that our introspective sense does not reveal the detailed nature/intrinsic properties of its objects
identifying mental and brain states is a literally unintelligible �category error�
but the mind-brain identity might be in the same position as previous intertheoretic reductions which seemed conceptually confused before being accepted
e.g. the conceptual confusion of saying that the earth moves when what it means to say that something moves is that it changes position relative to the earth
Leibniz� law:
two items are numerically identical just in case any property had by either one of them is also had by the other
(x)(y)[(x
= y) � (F)(Fx � Fy)]
this would refute the identity theory if you could find a property that is true of brain states but not mental states (or vice versa), e.g. ascribing:
spatial properties to mental states
semantic properties (e.g. the propositional content of beliefs) to brain states
he then considers how a specific sentence has propositional content:
it must be an integrated part of an entire system of sentences (a language) with which it has relations of entailment, consistency etc.
i.e. its propositional content is to play a distinct inferential role in a complex linguistic/cognitive economy
the brain states could be the role-playing elements, and so have propositional content by virtue of their inferential role
qualia properties:
1. my mental states are introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self
2. my brain states are not introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self
therefore, by Leibniz� law:
3. my mental states are not identical with my brain states
but this is wrong for the same reason that this syllogism is:
1. Muhammad Ali is widely known as a heavyweight champion
2. Cassius Clay is not widely known as a heavyweight champion
therefore, by Leibniz� law:
3. Muhammad Ali is not identical with Cassius Clay
intensional fallacy: the problem with these arguments is that the property of being known/recognised as something-or-other is not a genuine property of the item itself fit for divingin identities
the premises may reflect only our failure to appreciate objective identities
if we modify the argument to being �knowable by introspection�, it is free of the intensional fallacy
but the new premise:
2.�� unlike my mental states, my brain states are not knowable by introspection
is false, since if mental and brain states are identical, then it is brain states that we�ve been introspecting all along
at the very least, premise 2 begs the question against the identity theory
then considers Jackson�s Mary � she does not �know� what it is like to have a sensation-of-red
but this is an unwitting equivocation on �know�:
a) the neuroscientist �knows� in the sense of �has mastered the relevant set of neuroscientific propositions�
b) knowing what it is like to have a sensation-of-red in the sense of �has a prelinguistic representation of redness in her mechanisms for noninferential discrimination�
the identity theorist can admit a duality (or even plurality) of types of knowledge without commitment to a duality of types of things known
just because there�s a prelinguistic mode of sensory representation does not mean that sensations are beyond the reach of physical science, but only that the brain uses more modes and media of representation than the mere storage of sentences
functionalism = the essential/defining feature of any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to:
1. environmental effects on the body
2. other types of mental states
3. bodily behaviour
e.g. pain characteristically: results from bodily damage; causes distress + practical reasoning aimed at relief; makes us wince and nurse the wound etc.
any state that plays exactly that functional role is a pain
similarly, other types of mental states (sensations, emotions, beliefs etc.) are also defined by their unique causal roles in a complex economy internal states mediating sensory inputs and behavioural inputs
main difference from behaviourism:
the functionalist denies that it is possible to define each type of mental state solely in terms of environmental input and behavioural output
functionalism: adequately characterising any mental state involves an ineliminable reference to a variety of other mental states with which it is causally connected, so a reductive definition solely in terms of publicly observable inputs is quite impossible
main difference from the identity theory:
if we took an alien with (say) a silicon-based physiology, whose functional economy of internal states were indeed functionally isomorphic with our own internal economy � if those states were causally connected to inputs, to one another, and to behaviour in ways that parallel our own internal connections � then the alien would have pains/desires etc. just as fully as we, despite differences in the physical systems realising those functional states
functionalism: what is important for mentality �is not the matter of which the creature is made, but the structure of the internal activities which that matter sustains
��there are too many different kinds of physical
systems that can realise the functional economy characteristic of conscious
intelligence � it seems unlikely that the identity theorist is going to find
the one-to-one match-ups between the concepts of our common-sense mental
taxonomy and the concepts of an overarching theory that encompasses all of the
relevant physical systems � but that is what intertheoretic reduction is
standardly said to require. The prospect for universal identities, between
types of mental states and types of brain states, is therefore slim�???
if functionalists reject type-type identity, almost all of them remain committed to a weaker token-token ID theory = each instance of a given type of mental state is numerically identical with some specific physical state in some physical system or other
�this rejection [of the type-type identities] is
typically taken to support the claim that the science of psychology is/should
be methodologically autonomous from
the various physical sciences (from physics to neurophysiology) � psychology,
it is claimed, has its own irreducible laws and its own abstrct subject matter�(???)
functionalism�s popularity: partly because, in characterising mental states as essentially functional states, functionalism places the concerns of psychology at a level that abstracts from the teeming detail of a brain�s low-level (e.g. neurophysiological) structure
psychology is methodologically autonomous from these �engineering details�
this provides a rationale for the high-level abstract functional states posited in cognitive psychology + AI
by attempting to make relational properties the definitive feature of any mental state, functionalism ignores the �inner�/qualitative nature of our mental states, even though the qualia are the essential feature of a great many types of mental states, e.g.:
the inverted spectrum thought-experiment:
that my range of colour sensations is simply inverted relative to yours � but since we have no means of comparing qualia, and since we make all the same observational discriminations among objects
that is, we�re both functionally isomorphic, and so our two qualia (e.g. on seeing a tomato, my sensation-of-red, and your sensation-of-green) are (functionally) identical
Churchland thinks that it�s fair to respond that even if our intrinsic qualitative responses to functionally identical situations (e.g. having a sensation of red) are substantially different, they�re still all sensations of red
he thinks that qualia are just a short-cut means of identifying sensations, just as black-on-orange stripes serve as a salient feature for the quick visual identification of tigers
rather than being essential the type-identity of mental states, any more than black-on-orange stripes are essential to the type-identity of tigers
this requires the functionalist to admit the reality of qualia (within his materialist world picture)
Churchland thinks they can be accommodated by identifying them with physical properties of whatever physical states instantiate the mental/functional states that display them
this entails that functionally isomorphic but physically different creatures might have different qualia
the absent qualia problem:
differently instantiated systems might have complex states which have the same functional roles as ours, but without intrinsic qualia
again, functionalism seems at best an incomplete account of the nature of mental states
he thinks his solution for the inverted spectrum problem of identifying qualia with physical states also solves the absent qualia problem(??? pg 41)
he thinks that it would mean that sensory qualia are an inevitable concomitant of any system with the kidn of functional organisation at issue (though it may be difficult to see them from the outside)
he argues that the physical property of temperature has different instantiations for a gas, solid, plasma, vacuum etc.
but presumably this does not mean that thermodynamics is an �autonomous science� separable from the rest of physics, with its own irreducible laws and its own abstract non-physical subject matter
what it means is that reductions are domain-specific
so perhaps joy-in-a-human is �resonances in the lateral hypothalamus�, whereas joy-in-a-Martian is something else entirely
so there may be type-type reductions of mental to physical states, but they�ll be pretty narrow
and the functionalist claims of the radical autonomy of psychology can't be sustained
and that functionalism is not all that different from the ID theory (except that it denies universal type-type identities)
eliminative materialism doubts that the correct neuroscientific account of human capacities will produce a neat reduction of our common-sense framework
they think that our common-sense psychological framework (i.e. folk psychology) will not be intertheoretically reduced because �our common-sense psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behaviour and the nature of cognitive activity�
folk psychology is a misrepresentation of our internal states + activities
a truly adequate neuroscientific account of our inner lives will not provide theoretical categories that match up nicely with the categories of our common-sense framework � as a result, folk psychology will be eliminated by a mature neuroscience
elimination of the entire ontology of an older theory, e.g.:
the theory of heat as a fluid (�caloric�) being replaced by corpuscularian/kinetic theory (completely eliminating caloric from our accepted ontology)
the release of phlogiston when wood burns or metal rusts
Copernicus� new theory replacing the starry (crystal?) sphere of the heavens encompassing the earth
psychosis replacing witches + demonic possession
he thinks that our rexplanations of one another�s behaviour and private introspection will be transformed as we appeal to neurophaarmacological states etc. and this will lead to a more peaceful and humane society
what bollocks � that explanation won't change the way we think, and certainly won't be communicable or influential for most of society
distinguishing feature of eliminative materialism is its denial that a smooth intertheoretic reduction (even species-specific) of the framework of folk pscyhology to mature neuroscience is to be expected
this is because folk psychology is a very primitive + confused conception of our internal activities � why?:
1. widespread explanatory, predictive and manipulative failures of folk psychology
2. all our folk theories in the past have been replaced
3. �there are vastly many more ways of being an explanatorily successful neuroscience while not mirroring the structure of folk psychology, than there are ways of being an explanatorily successful neuroscience while also mirroring the very specific structure of folk psychology�, especially given that folk psychology appears to be untrue, hence the a priori probability of eliminative materialism is higher than the other theories
it all comes down to whether or not you reckon that the concepts of folk psychology will find vindicating match-ups in a matured neuroscience
criticisms:
arguably though, this is as weak an argument as the obvious existence of the heavens as a turning sphere
that is, all observation occurs within some system of concepts, and our observation judgements are only as good as the conceptual framework in which they are expressed
he responds that this criticism begs the question of meaningfulness � if eliminative materialism is true, meaningfulness must have some different source
he accepts that this may be the case, and it�s an empirical question
�What exactly is the evidence that we could explain all the "Easy" phenomena and still not understand the neural mechanisms for consciousness? (Call this the "left-out" hypothesis.) That someone can imagine the possibility is not evidence for the real possibility.�
also, �it begs the question against those theories that are exploring the possibility that functions such as attention and short-term memory are crucial elements in the consciousness.�
�It reminds me of the division, deep to medieval physicists, between sublunary physics (motion of things below the level of the moon) and superlunary physics (motion of things above the level of the moon).�
some of the vast psychological + neuroscientific literature �powerfully suggests that attention and awareness are pretty closely connected. The approach might of course be wrong, for it is an empirical conjecture. But if it is wrong, it is wrong because of the facts, not because of an arm-chair definition�
she thinks that the left-out hypothesis is driven by the conceivability of the zombie hypothesis
�As Francis Crick has observed, it might be like saying that one can imagine a possible world where gasses do not get hot, even though their constituent molecules are moving at high velocity�
yes, but this is an example of a reconceptualisation (of heat into molecular kinetic energy) that was problematic because of qualia� (see below and my points re Nagel (1974))
she also thinks that conceptions of qualia become less clear-cut once we move beyond �blueness� and pain, e.g. proprioception, �introspective qualia�
�The fact is, we are lacking important conceptual/theoretical ideas about how the nervous system performs fundamental functions -- such as time management, such as motor control, such as learning, such as information retrieval. We do not understand the role of back projections, or the degree to which processing is organized hierarchically. These are genuine puzzles, and it is unwise to 'molehill' them in order to 'mountain' up the problem of consciousness.�
�A prominent item in the fallacy roster is argumentum ad ignorantiam � argument from ignorance. The canonical version of this fallacy uses ignorance as the key premise from which a substantive conclusion is drawn. The canonical version looks like this:
We really do not understand much about a phenomenon P. (Science is largely ignorant about the nature of P.)
Therefore: we do know that:
(1) P can never be explained
or
(2) Nothing science could ever discover would deepen our understanding of P.
or
(3) P can never be explained in terms of properties of kind S.�
�Moreover, the mysteriousness of a problem is not a fact about the problem, it is not a metaphysical feature of the universe -- it is an epistemological fact about us�
i.e. �It is sometimes assumed that there can be a valid transition from �we cannot now explain� to �we can never explain�, so long as we have the help of a subsidiary premise, namely, �I cannot imagine how we could ever explain...��
�Suppose someone claims that she can imagine the mechanisms for sensorimotor integration in the human brain but cannot imagine the mechanisms for consciousness. What exactly does this difference amount to? � Suppose she answers that in a very general way she imagines that sensory neurons interact with interneurons that interact with motor neurons, and via these interactions, sensorimotor integration is achieved. Now if that is all �being able to imagine� takes, one might as well say one can imagine the mechanisms underlying consciousness. Thus: �The interneurons do it.��
gives examples of erroneous early thinking, e.g. that the problem of the precession of the perihelion of Mercury was much less hard than learning about the composition of the stars (one required the Einsteinian revolution and the other fell to spectral analysis) etc.
intended to show that �from the vantage point of ignorance, it is often very difficult to tell which problem is harder, which will fall first, what problem will turn out to be more tractable than some other�
�The philosophical lesson I learned from my biology teacher is this: when not much is known about a topic, don't take terribly seriously someone else's heartfelt conviction about what problems are scientifically tractable. Learn the science, do the science, and see what happens. �
I'm a materialist, but I believe that we will need to discover how matter is more complex than we realise (e.g. quantum mechanics) before we can much better understand mind in terms of body
is it true that �our best current theories describe [an electron] as a point-particle�???
why does he persist in talking in terms of �conscious intelligence�??? presumably it�s so that he can boil consciousness down to a total behavioural result, continuous with STM, attention and other cognitive/neurophysiological processes etc.
if Churchland�s characterisation of property dualism is correct/fair, then what do the property dualists expect to study in their new + autonomous �science of mental phenomena� beyond psychology/neurophys and something like qualia-focused English literature??? presumably, this nonsensicality is Churchland�s eliminativist point
his characterisation of epiphenomenalism as constant conjunction but not causality between volitions + actions is interesting re Hume�s question about where our idea of necessary connection comes from�
hmm, this is the problem with my similar argument about our idea of necessary connection deriving from the normativity of reason � it�s not just about where the idea comes from, but how we can be justified in applying it to events in the physical world, right???
if you say that �the essential/defining feature of any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to environmental effects, other mental states and bodily behaviour� � this may be how functionalism differentiates between/individuates mental states, but how does functionalism differentiate between mental + non-mental states???
surely functionalism doesn't really commit you to any theory of consciousness, although it implies one based on certain types of computation??? in this way, it�s a kind of organising paradigm/assumption in the philosophy of mind, but an empty one, right???
if all mental states are functional states, isn't that too wide a definition of a �mental state�, because heartbeats and cutaneous receptor activity and more or less any bodily activity plays some functional role somewhere (although perhaps at the extreme end of) the chain of processes linking sensory to motor???
in a way, you have to divorce your theory of consciousness from functionalism, since we definitely acknowledge that there are functional states that we would definitely want to call mental states, of which we are not conscious
e.g. why not solve the inverted + absent qualia problems by being an epiphenomenalist (or any type of property/substance dualist) functionalist???
you can't be an ID theory functionalist though, because ID theory + functionalism are in direct competition as definitions of what a mental state is � hmm, see his responses to the qualia objections to functionalism�
what was Child�s point about varieties of functionalism???
is functionalism a type of ID theory or vice versa??? perhaps neither is a subset??? is ID theory the same as functionalism??? no, ID theory is a subset of materialism, as is functionalism, right??? see above on functionalists remaining committed to token identity
�he thinks that qualia are just a short-cut means of identifying sensations, just as black-on-orange stripes serve as a salient feature for the quick visual identification of tigers� � this is wrong wrong wrong � it�s on the wrong level of explanation somehow � ah, that�s because I�m an epiphenomenalist..???
�folk psychology will be eliminated by a mature neuroscience� � this is so wrong � even if you accept his claim that folk psychology doesn't match up with our neural representations, there must be some level at which they match up perfectly, since more or less everybody agrees that our mental and physical states/behaviour match up in some way, and so there must be neural states underlying our folk psychological behaviour and qualia, surely???
moreover, even if the above weren't true, just as knowledge that colours are wavelengths etc. doesn't stop us seeing red and blue and doesn't make us see in terms of Hertz, a mature neuroscience that doesn't match up with folk psychology wouldn't stop us using folk psychology, at least not without futuristic neural surgery, surely???
I don�t understand why the elimination of folk psychology and the elimination of qualia are the same thing/go hand in hand for Churchland
he seems to accept that qualia do need explaining, and seems to adopt the identity theory in some form � but I thought he was anti-qualia??? what else is eliminative materialism???
I don't think Churchland says enough about what it would means for �the concepts of folk psychology will find vindicating match-ups in a matured neuroscience�, or not � we need examples etc.
I�m happy that the history of scientific reconceptualisations, and the way in which consciousness sits on its own as an Insurmountable-seeming Hard Problem amidst all the Tractable-seeming Problems is suspicious, so I suppose I do accept that a major reconceptualisation of the nature of the world will have to occur for us to understand consciousness within it, in which case the reason consciousness is a hard problem is because all problems that appear to require reconceptualisations are hard problems�
hmm, is that right??? would I consider the heart + animal spirits or lightning + electricity or sound and vibrations reconceptualisations as previously hard problems??? yes, they were completely irreconcilable-seeming dualities until they were reconciled. moreover, that irreconcilability (often/always???) stemmed (in part???) from their qualia-aspect, e.g. the quality of sound vs its physical manifestation etc.